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Abstract
In recent years many chaotic cryptosystems based on Baptista’s seminal work have
been proposed. We analyze the security of two of the newest and most interest-
ing ones, which use a dynamically updated look-up table and also work as stream
ciphers. We provide different attack techniques to recover the keystream used by
the algorithms. The knowledge of this keystream provides the attacker with the
same information as the key and thus the security is broken. We also show that
the dependence on the plaintext, and not on the key, of the look-up table updating
mechanism facilitates cryptanalysis.
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1 Introduction
Since M. S. Baptista proposed in 1998 a new cryptosystem based on the prop-
erty of ergodicity of chaotic systems [1], a number of new algorithms based
on variations of Baptista’s have been published [2,3,4,5,6]. In [7] we analyzed
the security and cryptographic robustness of Baptista’s seminal algorithm.
The first variation of Wong [2] was cryptanalyzed in [8]. We present in this
Letter our results after having thoroughly studied Wong’s second and third
algorithms [4,5].
The ergodicity property is exploited in these algorithms by using the logistic
map
yn+1 = byn(1− yn), (1)
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where yn ∈ [0, 1] and the parameter b is chosen so that Eq. (1) behaves chaot-
ically. In [4], the most interesting addition consists of using a dynamic table
for looking up the ciphertext and plaintext which is no longer fixed during
the whole encryption and decryption processes. Instead, it depends on the
plaintext, being continuously updated during the encryption and decryption
processes. This makes cryptanalysis more difficult, but not impossible.
When the ith message block is encrypted, the look-up table is updated dy-
namically by exchanging the ith entry li with another entry lj . The location
of the latter entry, i.e., the value of j, is determined by the current value of y
using the following formula:
υ =
⌊
y − ymin
ymax − ymin
×N
⌋
(2)
j = i+ υ mod N, (3)
where ymin and ymax are the end points of the chosen interval [ymin, ymax) and
N is the total number of entries in the table [4].
In [5], the previously described chaotic cryptographic scheme is generalized by
allowing the swapping of multiple pairs of entries in the look-up table during
the encryption of each input block, and by allowing multiple runs of encryption
on the whole message continuously. Starting from the current entry i, p pairs
of entries (p ≥ 1) are swapped according to the following rule: i ↔ (i + υ
mod N), (i+ υ+ 1 mod N)↔ (i+ 2υ+ 1 mod N), (i+ 2υ+ 2 mod N)↔
(i + 3υ + 2 mod N), . . . , (i + (p − 1)υ + p − 1 mod N) ↔ (i + pυ + p − 1
mod N). Once the message has been encrypted, the whole process is repeated
again r times, r ≥ 1. The final look-up table is the hash of the message [5].
2 Classical types of attacks
When cryptanalyzing a ciphering algorithm, the general assumption made is
that the cryptanalist knows exactly the design and working of the cryptosys-
tem under study, i.e., he knows everything about the cryptosystem except the
secret key. This is an evident requirement in today’s secure communications
networks, usually referred to as Kerchoff’s principle [9, p. 24]. According to
[9, p. 25], it is possible to differentiate between different levels of attacks on
cryptosystems. They are enumerated as follows, ordered from the hardest type
of attack to the easiest:
(1) Ciphertext only: The opponent possesses a string of ciphertext.
(2) Known plaintext: The opponent possesses a string of plaintext, p, and
the corresponding ciphertext, c.
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(3) Chosen plaintext: The opponent has obtained temporary access to the
encryption machinery. Hence he can choose a plaintext string, p, and
construct the corresponding ciphertext string, c.
(4) Chosen ciphertext: The opponent has obtained temporary access to the
decryption machinery. Hence he can choose a ciphertext string, c, and
construct the corresponding plaintext string, p.
In each of these four attacks, the objective is to determine the key that was
used. The last two attacks, which might seem unreasonable at first sight,
are very common when the cryptographic algorithm, whose key is fixed by the
manufacturer and unknown to the attacker, is embedded in a device which the
attacker can freely manipulate. Daily life examples of such devices are smart-
cards, electronic purse cards, GSM phone SIM (Subscriber Identity Module)
cards, POST (Point Of Sale Terminals) machines, or web application session
token encryption.
3 Keystream attacks
Although at first sight the cipher under study might look like a block cipher,
in fact it behaves as a stream cipher [9, p. 20], a fundamental weakness as is to
be seen. The operation of the algorithm as a stream cipher can be explained
as follows. Suppose K is the key, given by y0 and b, and that p = p1p2 . . . is
the plaintext string. A keystream k = k1k2 . . . is generated using Eq. (1). This
keystream is used to encrypt the plaintext string according to the rule
c = ek1(p1)ek2(p2) . . . = c1c2 . . .
Decrypting the ciphertext string c can be accomplished by computing the
keystream k given the knowledge of the key K and undoing the operations
eki . In [4] the keystream is the complete orbit followed by iterating Eq. (1)
from the initial point y0 with parameter near b = 4.0. The unit interval is
divided up into N equally spaced bins, each corresponding to a symbol of the
alphabet in use. However, instead of considering the whole unit interval, only
the subinterval [0.2, 0.8) is used. As a consequence of the natural invariant
density of Eq. (1), the orbit will visit frequently the forbidden subintervals
[0, 0.2) and [0.8, 1].
As an example of how to generate the keystream, let us iterate Eq. (1)
starting from y0 = 0.1777 and b = 3.9999995, as in [4]. Let si be the
symbol corresponding to each useful subinterval where yi lands, and let
x be the iterates which visit the forbidden subintervals. The orbit fol-
lowed is yi ={0.5844. . . , 0.9714. . . , 0.1109. . . , 0.3945. . . , 0.9555. . . , 0.1698. . . ,
0.5641. . . , 0.9835. . . , 0.0647. . . , 0.2420. . . , . . . }, and is transformed into the
3
keystream k = s165xxs84xxs156xxs18 . . . Next we show how to recover the
keystream using chosen ciphertext, chosen plaintext, and known plaintext at-
tacks. It is important to note that knowing the keystream k generated by a
certain key K (y0 and b) is entirely equivalent to knowing the key. Therefore,
our keystream attacks focus on recovering k.
3.1 How to circumvent the look-up table
The election of the look-up table updating method is most unfortunate, since
it allows the attacker to easily predict the new positions of the symbols even
without the exact knowledge of the value of y. In order to initially simplify our
analysis, we use a variable number N of symbols, N = 2n, n = 1, . . . , 8. First,
we assume that the source emits two different symbols, S2 = {s1, s2}. When
the orbit lands on the first subinterval [0.2, 0.5), the table will be updated
following Eqs. (2) and (3). Given that 0.2 ≤ y < 0.5, we have that
0 ≤ υ =
⌊
y − ymin
ymax − ymin
× 2
⌋
=
⌊
y − 0.2
0.6
× 2
⌋
< 1,
and thus υ = 0 and Eq. (3) is equivalent to:
j = i mod 2.
When the orbit lands on the second subinterval [0.5, 0.8), then 0.5 ≤ y < 0.8,
and thus υ = 1 and Eq. (3) becomes:
j = (i+ 1) mod 2.
If the source emits four different symbols, S4 = {s1, s2, s3, s4}, then υ = 0 if
the orbit lands on [0.2,0.35), υ = 1 if the orbit lands on [0.35,0.5), υ = 2 if
the orbit lands on [0.5,0.65), and υ = 3 if the orbit lands on [0.65,0.8).
The generalization for higher order sources is immediate. Even when multiple
pairs are swapped at each encryption run, as in [5], the look-up table evolution
is easily predicted. As a consequence, the look-up table plays no significant
security role during the encryption process. It is not necessary to know the
exact value of y to predict the next update. It suffices to know the subinterval
where y lands. Therefore, the updated table depends solely on the plaintext,
and not on the key (y0 and b), to the advantage of the attacker. When en-
crypting the same plaintext using different keys, the same updating sequence
will take place for the look-up table. Likewise, the same message will always
yield the same hash value regardless of the key used.
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3.2 How to obtain the keystream
In this subsection different attacks are described. Each of them aims at the
recovery of the keystream.
3.2.1 Chosen ciphertext attack
The chosen ciphertext attack is straightforward. Simply request the plaintext
of the one-block ciphertexts c = 1, c = 2, c = 3, . . . , until the desired length
of the keystream is reached. Either the correct symbol (when the iterate lands
on a site) or an error (when it lands outside the boundaries) is obtained,
one by one. Once the desired length of keystream has been recovered in this
way, any message encrypted with the same values of y0 and b can easily be
decrypted. Under this attack, the dynamically updated look-up table has no
effect at all. This attack requires as many one-block ciphertexts as the length
of the keystream that is to be recovered. This attack does not work on [5],
because the attacker does not know the encrypted values of p and r, the first
two blocks of the ciphertext.
3.2.2 Chosen plaintext attack
Let us deal with the chosen plain text attack next. To make things even simpler
at first, we assume the fourth order symbol source S4 and that rmax = 1 (see
[4]). Although unknown to the cryptanalyst, the system key K is given by
y0 = 0.1777 and b = 3.9999995, using the interval [0.2, 0.8), as in [4].
Our goal is to find out the exact position of all occurrences of s1,s2,s3, and
s4 in the keystream. But this task is not as easy as requesting the ciphertext
of p = s1s1s1 . . . , then of p = s2s2s2 . . . , etc., as in [7]. The dynamic look-up
table prevents knowing whether a certain symbol corresponds to its original
position in the table or has been already changed. But given that the changes
produced in the table are known even when the exact value of y is unknown,
the following attack can be designed.
First, in order to know the exact position of all symbols s1 in the keystream
k, we need to construct an adequate plaintext p. Table 1 represents the final
result of the process followed to compute the correct value of p. We start
constructing Table 1 by filling in columns i and ki, already known in advance.
Columns 0, 1, 2, and 3 reflect the current state of the look-up table, i.e., which
symbol is at which position at any given moment. Next, we proceed row by
row, in the following way:
(1) Assign to pi the value of the symbol (s1, s2, s3, or s4) in the previous row
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in the subinterval corresponding to ki. At start, the look-up table is not
yet altered.
(2) Calculate j = (i+ ki) mod 4.
(3) Update the look-up table by interchanging the symbols in the subintervals
i, j.
(4) Proceed to the next row.
After proceeding in this way, the plaintext that corresponds to all symbols s1
in the keystream is worked out: p = 0 0 0 0 0 . . . This plaintext is always peri-
odic. The corresponding ciphertext is requested, obtaining: c = 10 9 6 6 7 . . . .
Hence, it is known for sure that there is a true symbol s1 at the 10th
position, and at the 19th, etc. The partial keystream already obtained is
k = xxxxxxxxxs1xxxxxxxxs1xxxxxs1xxxxxs1xxxxxxs1 . . .
Next, we are to obtain the exact position of all symbols s2 by con-
structing Table 2. This table informs us that we have to request the ci-
phertext of p = 1 0 2 2 2 0 3 3 3 0 1 1 . . . , obtaining c =
4 11 14 5 . . . The improved partial keystream already obtained is k =
xxxs2xxxxxs1xxxxs2xxxs1xxxxxs1xxxs2xs1xxs2xxxs1 . . .
If we repeat this process, generating Table 3 and 4 for symbols s3 and s4,
and requesting the corresponding ciphertexts, we would obtain the following
complete keystream:
k = s3xxs2xxs3xxs1s4s4s4xs2xxxs1s4s4xs3xs1s4s4xs2xs1s4xs2xxxs1 . . . (4)
The generalization for higher order sources is immediate. This attack is very
inexpensive too, since it only requires N = 2n plaintexts, 1 ≤ n ≤ 8.
When rmax > 1, the same procedure must be followed. However, there will
be blanks in the recovered keystream, because many valid iterations will be
skipped. In many cases, though, it is possible to narrow down the number
of possible symbols. Once the partial keystream has been worked out, while
trying to decrypt a ciphertext following the decryption method, iterates will
land on an x. The only possible symbols for those x are those lying before
the x at a distance smaller than rmax. In this way, the possibilities are greatly
reduced, in many cases to only one possible value (the correct one). When more
than one value is possible, there are two courses of action. If the plaintext is not
of random nature, then the gaps can easily be filled selecting by the context
one symbol amongst the possible ones. On the other hand, if the plaintext is
random, then a new plaintext must be requested, made by all the previous
correct symbols plus one of the candidates. If the ciphertext is equal to the
expected one, then the guess was correct. Otherwise, new plaintexts must be
encrypted until the correct guess is used.
There is still another possible modification presented in [4]. A new parameter,
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called threshold (ythreshold), can be introduced along with the key. The current
value of y can be checked against this threshold, so that the table is updated
only when y > ythreshold. However, although it is assumed that this addition
improves security, it is very easy to deduce which is the subinterval to which
ythreshold belongs. It can be observed in Table 1 that when the plaintext symbol
to be encrypted is s1, the table is never effectively updated. After the N = 2
n
tables are constructed, if ythreshold > ymin, then there must occur repeated
values in the recovered keystream. Given that the position of s1 is always
correct in the keystream, we know for sure that symbols st for t > 1 which
coincide with a previous s1 symbol must be incorrect. The greatest value of
t indicates which is the symbol ythreshold belongs to. This attack works on [5]
too. The attacker can still predict the evolution of the look-up table with the
only knowledge of the plaintext.
3.2.3 Known plaintext attack
Under this attack, each plaintext/ciphertext pair allows for the recovery of
a portion of the keystream. For the sake of simplicity and without loss of
generality, let us use once again the S4 source, rmax = 1, and ythreshold =
ymin. Let us set p = 1 0 3 0 0 . . . , whose ciphertext is c = 4 11 5 9 5 . . .
Table 5 can be easily constructed, which allows to recover a correct portion of
the keystream: k = xxxs2xxxxxxxxxxs2xxxxs4xxxxxxxxs2xxxxs2 . . . This
process should be repeated with as many known plaintexts as possible, to
recover as big a portion of the keystream as possible. Therefore, this attack
does not guarantee total recovery of the keystream. It would work in a similar
way for [5].
3.3 How to decrypt using the keystream
In the previous subsection, different methods to obtain the complete keystream
where introduced. Next, we explain how to recover the plaintext from a ci-
phertext when the keystream is known.
For simplicity, the fourth order symbol source S4 is used. We assume the
attacker already knows the keystream given by Eq. (4) and possesses the
following ciphertext: c = 1 10 4 4 4 . . . In order to decrypt it, Table 6 is
constructed in the following way. First, fill all the values of ki with the symbol
found in the keystream at the positions indicated by the ciphertext. Next,
according to the current state of the look-up table, assign the correct value
to pi which corresponds to each ki. Calculate the value of j and update the
look-up table accordingly. Move to the next row and repeat the process until
the ciphertext has been exhausted.
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4 Security of the hash
We have tested that breaking the hash algorithm is possible when p = 1 and
r = 1, even without the knowledge of the key (y0 and b). Let us consider for
example the following message: “Transfer $10000 to Alvarez’s account.”. If
encoded using 4-bit symbols, its hash is h = 1E825BC0A36974FD, expressed
in hexadecimal. Changing the message into “Transfer $30005 to Alvarez’s ac-
count.” produces exactly the same hash. In order to avoid attacks on the
hashing scheme, it is all important that r > 1 and p > 1. In effect, in [5]
two runs and a small value of p are suggested. Greater values would increase
security, but penalize on speed.
Although in [5] it is claimed that this hash can be treated as a message authen-
tication code (MAC), in fact it can not. A MAC is a key-dependent one-way
hash function. However, as already proved, the look-up table, and hence the
hash, does not depend on the key (y0 and b). Therefore, this scheme does not
behave as a MAC but as a one-way hash function, even though the knowledge
of the key is necessary to verify the hash when both authenticity and secrecy
are to be provided.
5 Conclusions
In spite of dynamically updating the look-up table, the same fundamental
weakness present in Baptista’s algorithm [1] is reproduced in the chaotic cryp-
tosystems proposed in [4,5], as proved by our different attacks. As a conse-
quence of our attacks, an important conclusion is that implementations of
these algorithms can never reuse the same key because if so, they are easily
broken. Furthermore, the look-up table does not depend on the key, but only
on the plaintext, thus facilitating cryptanalysis. After these attacks, we con-
clude that the lack of security, along with the low encryption speed, discourage
the use of these algorithms for secure applications. We are to investigate how
the weaknesses outlined in this Letter might affect the security of other Wong’s
variants [6].
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Table 1
Plaintext (pi) needed to find out the exact position of symbols s1 (ki = s1 = 0).
i j 0 1 2 3 ki pi
- - s1 s2 s3 s4 - -
0 0 s1 s2 s3 s4 0 s1
1 1 s1 s2 s3 s4 0 s1
2 2 s1 s2 s3 s4 0 s1
3 3 s1 s2 s3 s4 0 s1
Table 2
Plaintext (pi) needed to find out the exact position of symbols s2 (ki = s2 = 1).
i j 0 1 2 3 ki pi
- - s1 s2 s3 s4 - -
0 1 s2 s1 s3 s4 1 s2
1 2 s2 s3 s1 s4 1 s1
2 3 s2 s3 s4 s1 1 s3
3 0 s1 s3 s4 s2 1 s3
4 ≡ 0 1 s3 s1 s4 s2 1 s3
5 ≡ 1 2 s3 s4 s1 s2 1 s1
6 ≡ 2 3 s3 s4 s2 s1 1 s4
7 ≡ 3 0 s1 s4 s2 s3 1 s4
8 ≡ 0 1 s4 s1 s2 s3 1 s4
9 ≡ 1 2 s4 s2 s1 s3 1 s1
10 ≡ 2 3 s4 s2 s3 s1 1 s2
11 ≡ 3 0 s1 s2 s3 s4 1 s2
Table 3
Plaintext (pi) needed to find out the exact position of symbols s3 (ki = s3 = 2).
i j 0 1 2 3 ki pi
- - s1 s2 s3 s4 - -
0 2 s3 s2 s1 s4 2 s3
1 3 s3 s4 s1 s2 2 s1
2 0 s1 s4 s3 s2 2 s1
3 1 s1 s2 s3 s4 2 s3
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Table 4
Plaintext (pi) needed to find out the exact position of symbols s4 (ki = s4 = 3).
i j 0 1 2 3 ki pi
- - s1 s2 s3 s4 - -
0 3 s4 s2 s3 s1 3 s4
1 0 s2 s4 s3 s1 3 s1
2 1 s2 s3 s4 s1 3 s1
3 2 s2 s3 s1 s4 3 s1
4 ≡ 0 3 s4 s3 s1 s2 3 s4
5 ≡ 1 0 s3 s4 s1 s2 3 s2
6 ≡ 2 1 s3 s1 s4 s2 3 s2
7 ≡ 3 2 s3 s1 s2 s4 3 s2
8 ≡ 0 3 s4 s1 s2 s3 3 s4
9 ≡ 1 0 s1 s4 s2 s3 3 s3
10 ≡ 2 1 s1 s2 s4 s3 3 s3
11 ≡ 3 2 s1 s2 s3 s4 3 s3
Table 5
Partial keystream (ki) recovered when both plaintext (pi) and ciphertext (ci) are
known.
i j 0 1 2 3 ki pi ci
- - s1 s2 s3 s4 - - -
0 1 s2 s1 s3 s4 s2 = 1 s2 4
1 2 s2 s3 s1 s4 s2 = 1 s1 11
2 1 s2 s1 s3 s4 s4 = 3 s4 5
3 0 s4 s1 s3 s2 s2 = 1 s1 9
4 ≡ 0 1 s1 s4 s3 s2 s2 = 1 s1 5
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Table 6
Plaintext (pi) recovered when the keystream (ki) is known.
i j 0 1 2 3 ki pi
- - s1 s2 s3 s4 - -
0 2 s3 s2 s1 s4 s3 = 2 s3
1 0 s2 s3 s1 s4 s4 = 3 s4
2 3 s2 s3 s4 s1 s2 = 1 s3
3 3 s2 s3 s4 s1 s1 = 0 s2
4 ≡ 0 2 s4 s3 s2 s1 s3 = 2 s4
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